Searching for Proper Judicial Recognition of Hospital Ethics Committees in Decisions to Forego Medical Treatment by Murphy, Carol A.
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 20 | Issue 2 Article 4
January 1990
Searching for Proper Judicial Recognition of
Hospital Ethics Committees in Decisions to Forego
Medical Treatment
Carol A. Murphy
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carol A. Murphy, Searching for Proper Judicial Recognition of Hospital Ethics Committees in Decisions to Forego Medical Treatment, 20
Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1990).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss2/4
SEARCHING FOR PROPER 
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF 
HOSPITAL ETHICS COMMITTEES 
IN DECISIONS TO FOREGO 
MEDICAL TREATMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining 
medical treatment arises with increasing regularity in the United 
States, prompted by a growing elderly population and constant 
technological advances.1 A Hospital Ethics Committee (HEC)2 
may be utilized to assist in making treatment decisions for in-
competent patients, but there is inconsistency in the deference 
given to HECs by courts. Neither federal nor state statutes have 
addressed the proper role of HECs in health care decisionmak-
ing, and common law on the subject is conflicting.3 
A competent patient has the right to make his or her own 
1. Comment, Recognizing the Value of Hospital Ethics Committees: Time for Judi-
cial Reassessment, 18 TOLEDO L. REV. 195, 198 (1989). The dilemma caused by advances 
in medical science is evident in a statement made by a prominent neurologist that "[o]n 
the one hand, many patients now survive and leave the hospital without brain damage; 
yet, as a necessary [consequence], we are producing patients with syndromes of severe, 
irreversible brain damage." Cranford, Brain Death and the Persistent Vegetative State, 
in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 62 
(A.E. Doudera & J.D. Peters eds. 1982). 
2. "True" Hospital Ethics Committees, sometimes called Institutional Ethics Com-
mittees, as addressed in this comment, are groups of people with diverse backgrounds 
which assist patients, their families, and medical practitioners in making medical deci-
sions which involve moral issues. See infra notes 59-80 and accompanying text. Compare 
with Institutional Review Committees (lRCs) , sometimes called Hospital Review Com-
mittees (HRCs) or Institutional Review Boards(lRBs), which review medical decisions, 
prognoses, and opinions. See generally Robertson, The Law of Institutional Review 
Boards, 26 UCLA L. REV. 484. 487-88 (1979). Ethics committees can also be found in 
nursing homes and dialysis centers. Cohen, Ethics Committees, 18 HASTINGS CENTER RE-
PORT 11 (1988). The focus of this comment is ethics committees in hospitals, but the 
principles may be applied more broadly in most cases. 
3. See infra notes 81-114 and accompanying text. 
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treatment decisions.4 This includes the initiation, withdrawal, 
and refusal of medical treatment. II Similarly, while competent6, a 
patient may exercise his or her right of autonomy by executing a 
document? such as a living will,s durable power of attorney9 or 
health care directive. lo When the patient is incompetent and 
there is no directive, the decision is left to family members, doc-
tors, and courts of law, with or without the input of an ethics 
committee. 
Once it has been determined that the patient has the right 
to refuse treatment,11 questions arise as to who will and who will 
4. This doctrine is often traced to Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 
105 N.E. 92 (1914), overruled on other grounds, in which Judge Cardozo wrote that 
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall 
be done with his own body." Id. at 129, 105 N.E. at 93. The right has been applied to 
recent cases involving the termination of treatment as well. In Bartling v. Superior 
Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984), a competent, seriously ill pa-
tient's desire to die naturally was frustrated by medical practitioners who refused his 
instructions to disconnect a mechanical respirator. The hospital and physicians also re-
fused to honor instructions by the patient's wife, whom the patient had authorized with 
a durable power of attorney to make medical treatment decisions. The court found that 
the patient had the right to control his own medical treatment and held that the pa-
tient's wishes must be honored. Id. at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225. See also In re Farrell, 
108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987). 
5. "The obvious corollary to [the principle that a doctor commits a battery by treat-
ing without consent] is that a competent adult patient has the legal right to refuse medi-
cal treatment." Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. 
484, 489 (1983). 
6. Competency, or having the appropriate legal standing, is often associated with 
capacity. However, these two terms are not identical. 
7. Many state statutes now recognize the validity of certain health care directives. 
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (Deering 1987). 
8. A living will has been defined as "a written statement that specifically explains 
the patient's preferences about life-sustaining treatment." In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 378, 
529 A.2d 419, 426 (1987,. 
9. A durable power of attorney is defined as "an individual's written designation of 
another person to act on his behalf' which may be limited to action regarding health 
care decisions. THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUS-
TAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 140. 
10. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBS. IN MED. AND BIOMED. 
AND BEHAVIORAL RES., MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 156-66 (1982) [hereinafter PRESI-
DENT'S COMM'N REPORT I] and PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBS. IN 
MED. AND BIOMED. AND BEHAVIORAL REs., DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT 5 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT II]. 
11. The issue of whether a patient has a right to decide whether to terminate or 
withhold life-sustaining medical treatment, often called the "right to die," is not directly 
addressed in this comment. That issue was recently addressed by the United States Su-
preme Court in Cruzan v. Missouri, 58 U.S.L.W. 4916 (1990). The Court simply held that 
a Missouri requirement that evidence of an incompetent's wishes as to the withdrawal of 
treatment be proved by clear and convincing evidence was constitutional. The majority 
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not be responsible for the decision. If a treatment decision in-
volving an HEC is contested and must be decided by a court, 
the judge12 will have to determine the appropriate level of defer-
ence to give the HEC determination.1s This comment will ex-
plore the levels of judicial scrutiny applied to HEC decisions re-
garding life-sustaining medical treatment and explore the proper 
role of HECs within the American jurispruden'tial system. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HOSPITAL ETHICS 
COMMITTEES 
Early "ethics committees" had clearly limited purposes and 
bear little resemblance to modern HECs. The first ethics com-
mittee is said to have originated in Seattle in 1960 in the wake 
of a medical breakthrough, the kidney dialysis machine. a A 
committee was established to aid in choosing the patients who 
would receive priority for kidney dialysis treatment. It was made 
up of a lawyer, a minister, a banker, a housewife, a government 
official, a labor leader, and a surgeon. Despite efforts to be fair, 
decision did not state the circumstances under which a "right to die" exists, nor did any 
of the five opinions (including two concurring and two dissenting) mention the role of 
HECs in decisionmaking. The questions raised in this comment become relevant once it 
has been determined that there is a right to make such a decision. 
12. Legal proceedings involving the question of medical treatment for an incompe-
tent do not involve juries because relief is usually declaratory. The judge typically weighs 
the patient's right to privacy in making such a decision against the four "state interests": 
the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the integrity of the medical profession, 
and protection of innocent third parties. See, e.g. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 
216-18, 741 P.2d 674, 683-85 (1987); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741-45, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-27 (1977); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 
2d 114, 122, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983), overruled in part, In re Hamlin, 102 Wash, 2d 
810,689 P.2d 1372 (1984). Note, Balancing the Right to Die With Competing Interests: 
A Socio-Legal Enigma, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 109, 112-16 (1985). 
13. The function of ethics committees in decisionmaking ranges from encouraging 
discussion to actually adopting recommendations or determinations for particular cases. 
The determinations are usually advisory and rarely binding. Wolf, Ethics Committees In 
The Courts, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 12 (1986). The determinations, also called de-
cisions or recommendations, are often very persuasive. Gibson & Kushner, Will the 
"Conscience of an Institution" Become Society's Servant?, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 
10 (1986). See also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT II at 162-63. 
14. Dr. Belding Scribner of the University of Washington had just introduced long-
term hemodialysis for the treatment of end-stage renal disease. Between 1960 and 1972, 
there were not enough dialysis machines for all chronic kidney patients, and screening by 
medical criteria still left too many candidates. The doctors involved decided to appoint 
an impartial body to choose the relatively few candidates who would receive dialysis 
treatment. The remaining patients were given little chance for survival. B. HOSFORD. 
BIOETHICS COMMITTEES. THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER'S GUIDE 65-67 (1986). 
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the decision making process drew quick and harsh criticism. 111 
Another early type of "ethics committee" was used by insti-
tutions to determine which pregnancies could be terminated 
through therapeutic abortions at a time when most abortions 
were illegal.16 The decision was a medical one, as the only justifi-
cation was endangerment to the pregnant woman.17 
Legal recognition of hospital ethics committees traces back 
to the case of Karen Ann Quinlan.18 In that landmark case, the 
court validated the recommendation by a hospital ethics com-
mittee to allow life support systems to be removed.19 The pa-
tient was twenty-two years old and in a persistent vegetative 
state.20 The court encouraged the formation of HECs by sug-
gesting "that it would be more appropriate to provide a regular 
forum for more input and dialogue in individual situations and 
to allow the responsibility of these judgments to be shared. "21 
The opinion cited an article by Dr. Karen Teel revealing the di-
lemma doctors were facing in the treatment of terminally ill pa-
tients.lI2 The court seemed sympathetic with the plight of a phy-
sician forced to make ethical judgments.28 
15. The factors which the committee based its decisions upon were: patients' ages 
and sex, marital status and number of dependents, income, net worth, emotional stabil-
ity, educational background, nature of occupation, and past performance and future po-
tential. Id. One article, criticizing that unarticulated factors favored the "middle-class 
America social value system shared by the selection panel," noted "[a) candidate who 
plans to come before this committee would seem well-advised to father' a great many 
children, then to throwaway all his money." Alexander, They decide Who Lives, Who 
Dies, 53 LIFE 102 (1962). 
16. B. HOSFORD, supra note 14, at 65. 
17. Id. 
18. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
19.Id. 
20. Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654. A patient in a "chronic persistent vegetative state" 
was defined in Quinlan by Dr. Fred Plum as one "who remains with the capacity to 
maintain the vegetative parts of neurological function but who no longer has any cogni-
tive function." Id. Although Karen Ann Quinlan was in a persistent vegetative state, it 
was pointed out that she was not "brain dead" as defined by the Ad Hoc Committee of 
Harvard Medical School. Id. The Ad Hoc standards include "absen'ce of response to pain 
or other stimuli, pupilary reflexes, corneal, pharyngeal and other reflexes, blood pressure, 
spontaneous respiration, as well as 'flat' or isoelectric electroencephalograms and the 
like, with all tests repeated 'at least 24 hours later with no change.''' Id. at 27, 355 N.J. 
at 356. 
21. Id. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668 (quoting Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A Doctor's 
View: What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR LAW REV. 6, 8 (1975». 
22. Teel, supra note 21. 
23. "Physicians, by virtue of their responsibility for medical judgments are, partly 
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The Quinlan opinion supported hospital ethics committees, 
but admitted "the authority of these committees is primarily re-
stricted to the hospital setting and their official status is more 
that of an advisory body than of an enforcing body."2' The pri-
mary justification for reliance on such committees was the diffu-
sion of responsibility, mainly for the benefit of the medical 
practitioner.2& 
The Quinlan case was a boost to the formation of HECs,26 
but has been criticized for several reasons. The recommenda-
tions of Quinlan actually had medical descriptions and defini-
tions in mind, not moral dilemmas. The result was to offer medi-
cal "second opinions" to practitioners so that medical prognoses 
would be confirmed and responsibility of the decision was dif-
fused. In this respect, the court was not suggesting an ethics 
committee, but rather a "risk management" or "liability con-
trol" committee whose main function was to disperse the re-
sponsibility of difficult medical decisions.27 Currently, many hos-
pitals utilize committees to confirm medical diagnoses which 
may be called "ethics committees", but function as Institutional 
Review Boards.28 
The Quinlan opinion was broader than the facts warranted. 
It discussed hospital ethics committees as if they were common, 
referring to the number of hospitals which had established eth-
ics committees as "many."29 The idea of ethics committees in 
hospitals had not yet, in fact, gained wide acceptance. so The 
by choice and partly by default, charged with the responsibility of making ethical judg-
ments which we are sometimes ill-equipped to make." Quinlan at 49, 355 A.2d at 668 
(quoting Teel, supra note 21, at 8). 
24. [d. (quoting Teel, supra note 21, at 9). 
25. [d. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669. Diffusion of responsibility benefits the practitioner 
legally as well as psychologically. 
26. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. 
27. The diffusion of responsibility for decisionmaking was an advantage of HECs 
suggested by Dr. Teel. Teel, supra note 21, at 9. 
28. See supra note 2. 
29. The court may have been misled by the Teel article from which it quoted, 
"[mlany hospitals have established an Ethics Committee composed of phY$icians, social 
workers, attorneys, and theologians ... which serves to review the individual circum-
. stances of ethical dilemma and which has provided much in the way of assistance and 
safeguards for patients and their medical caretakers." Quinlan at 49, 355 A.2d at 668 
(quoting Teel, supra note 21, at 9). 
30. There were probably no ethics committees in 1975 which operated as Dr. Teel 
described. B. HOSFORD. supra note 14, at 69. 
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Quinlan court did not foresee the growth in both the issues 
faced by ethics committees and the liability questions involving 
HECs which later ,courts have been forced to confront. 
The Quinlan court's sympathy for medical practitioners 
seemed to be based on an improper characterization of the doc-
tor as the "decisionmaker".31 Under the doctrine of informed 
consent, medical treatment decisions are made by the patient32 
or, if the patient is incompetent, by a surrogate. Physicians have 
a duty to inform decisionmakers of the patient's condition and 
treatment options.33 
A significant development in the law was the articulation of 
two tests to determine the basis of the decision to forego medical 
treatment for incompetent patients. Following Quinlan, the New 
Jersey courts were forced to decide whether to withdraw life-
sustaining procedures from several patients.84 Most of the cases 
were decided in favor of withdrawal, allowing the patient to die 
without the treatment.S& Although HECs were not involved in 
these decisions, the tests used are universally applicable once it 
has been determined that there is a right to make the decision.36 
31. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
32. [E)ach man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if he be of 
sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or other 
medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an operation or form of 
treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him to substi-
tute his own judgment for that of the patient .... 
Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406-407, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960). See generally 
KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984). 
33. Professionals in both the medical and legal fields are still struggling with the 
scope of disclosure required by the doctor. Dilemmas include cases in which the practi-
tioner may feel that disclosure may do more harm than good. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N 
REPORT I at 70-102. See also KATZ, supra note 32, at 166-75. 
34. Matter of Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985)(Removal of nasogastric 
tube from semi-vegetative woman with life expectancy of one year); Matter of Farrell, 
108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987)(Mentally competent woman with Arterial Lateral 
Scherosis requested that respirator be disconnected); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 
419 (1987)(Nursing home refused to remove tube from comatose, vegetative patient after 
request made by her power of attorney based on a "living will"); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 
394, 529 A.2d 434 (l987)(After surgery caused irreversible damage to pregnant woman, 
nursing home refused permission to remove tube from patient in persistent vegetative 
state). 
35. The court in Conroy reversed a lower court ruling in favor of terminating treat-
ment, but the case was not remanded in light of the patient's death. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 
388, 486 A.2d at 1244. 
36. See supra note 11. 
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The first test is the "substituted judgment approach."37 
This method attempts to make the choice which the patient 
would have made had he or she been able.38 The substituted 
judgment approach favors the person's right to privacy and con-
siders the individual's attitudes and morals.a9 It is generally fol-
lowed where the patient has made clear at least some basic pref-
erences regarding the foregoing of medical treatment.40 To 
consider these preferences in making the decision; the patient 
had to have been competent to make the decision for himself at 
the time the preference was made known.41 
The second test utilizes the "best interests" standard,42 
which is typically applied where a lack of evidence about the 
patient's choice precludes the substituted judgment approach. 
The best interests test requires the surrogate decisionmaker to 
choose the course of treatment or non-treatment which best pro-
motes the patient's well-being.48 The standard is objective, with 
no reference to the patient's actual or supposed preferences.44 
Though it seems .contradictory, courts have decided in favor of 
terminating life-sustaining treatment based on the best interest 
of the patient.411 These tests often overlap, making it difficult to 
determine what approach was actually used.46 
37. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 758, 370 
N.E.2d 417, 430 (1977); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 427, 497 
N.E.2d 626, 636 (1986). 
38. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT I at 178-179. 
39. One court recognized the "unwritten constitutional right of privacy" which pro-
tects a patient against unwanted infringements of bodily integrity. Saikewicz at 739, 370 
N.E.2d at 424. 
40. In In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980): Brother Fox, an 83-
year-old member of a Catholic religious order called the Society of Mary, was being 
maintained in a permanent vegetative state by a respirator. Father Eichner, local direc-
tor of the society, applied to have the respirator removed on the ground that it was 
against the patient's wishes as expressed prior to his becoming incompetent. This re-
quest was supported by the patient's 10 nieces and nephews, his only surviving relatives. 
The Appellate Division. held that the patient's right to decline treatment was guaranteed 
by the common law as well as the Constitution. Id. 
41. It is preferable, but not required, that the patient's preferences be incorporated 
into a written health care directive. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. 
42. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); In re Torres, 357 
N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984). . 
43. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT I at 179-80. 
44.Id. 
45. See, e.g., Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674; Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332. 
46. "At some point, as the evidence of the patient's subjective intent becomes less 
and less trustworthy, the exercise of substituted judgment shades into a best interests 
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The Quinlan court endorsed further study into hospital eth-
ics committees,47 but little research was published until 1983. In 
that year, HECs again gained attention when the President's 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research reported on issues related 
to ethical problems in medicine.48 At that time, attending physi-
cians were primarily responsible for assuring high quality treat-
ment decisions.49 The President's Commission recognized that 
ethics committees could play a broader role than the narrow 
function embraced by Quinlan.60 The Commission's report sug-
gested that health care institutions "explore and evaluate vari-
ous formal and informal administrative arrangements for review 
and consultation, such as 'ethics committees.' " III Although the 
focus of the report emphasized decisions to foregoll2 life-sus-
taining treatment,1I3 the discussion of the potential role of HECs 
included recognition of a greater need for research into the use 
of ethics committees in a variety of treatment decisions.1I4 
Another impetus for the development of HECs was the dis-
analysis .... " Pollock, Life and Death Decisions: Who Makes Them and by What Stan-
dards?, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 505, 515 (1989). 
47. The opinion reiterated Dr. Teel's statement that "[tlhe concept of an Ethics 
Committee which has this kind of organization and is readily accessible to those persons 
rendering medical care to patients, would be, I think, the most promising direction for 
further study at this point." Quinlan at 49, 355 A.2d at 668 (1976) (quoting Teel, supra 
note 21, at 9). 
48. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT II. See pages 1-4 for general purposes and findings 
of the Commission. The Commission's earlier report dealt with forms of consent to medi-
cal treatment. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT I. The first report mentioned HECs 
briefly in recommending that "[hlealth care institutions should explore and evaluate va-
rious informal administrative arrangements, such as 'ethics committees,' for review and 
consultation in nonroutine matters involving health care decision-making for those who 
cannot decide." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT I at 6. 
49. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT II at 153. 
50. Beyond the diagnosis and prognosis confirmation role endorsed by Quinlan, the 
Commission suggests three additional functions which are now widely accepted: educat-
ing, formulating policies, and reviewing treatment decisions. [d. at 160-61. See infra 
notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
51. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT II at 5. 
52. The term "forego", as used in the Commission's report, encompasses both non-
initiation or the withholding of medical treatment and discontinuation of ongoing treat-
ment or withdrawal. [d. at 2 n. 1. 
53. The President's Commission defined "life sustaining" treatment as encompass-
ing "all health care interventions that have the effect of increasing the lifespan of the 
patient," including respirators and kidney machines as well as more passive activities 
which have the effect of prolonging the patient's life. [d. at 3. 
54. [d. 
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cussion surrounding the adoption of the "Baby Doe" regula-
tions. Ii Ii These regulations encouraged the formation of "infant 
bioethics committees" to review decisions against aggressive 
medical treatment for handicapped newborns to safeguard 
against discrimination on the basis of handicap. lie Many hospi-
tals realized the value of HECs after implementing procedures 
conforming to the "Baby Doe" regulations.1I7 Whatever the rea-
son for initiating the formation of an HEC, most hospitals now 
use ethics committees, and their numbers' are growing.1I8 
III. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF MODERN HECS 
After considering the foundation and background of HECs, 
it is appropriate to analyze the operational and functional as-
pects of ethics committees before considering the proper role of 
HECs in decisionmaking. HECs can be characterized by func-
tion and composition.1I8 The issues before an HEC and its proce-
dural processes are often unique to the institution. Therefore, 
the goals of HECs are as varied as the institutions which they 
serve. 
Generally, HECs serve four functions.eo First, the HEC edu-
cates the entire medical staff at a hospital in an effort to im-
prove communication. Second, it assists in drafting policies to be 
adopted by a hospital. Third, it consults with staff members, pa-
tients, and family members, usually by appointing one or two 
55. Ethics Committees Double Since '83: Survey, HOSPITALS, Nov, I, 1985, at 60, 64 
(Attributed the increase in ethics committees to the Baby Doe regulations). See also 
Cranford & Doudera, The Emergence of Institutional Ethics Committees, 12 LAW. 
MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE 13. 
56. See B. HOSFORD. supra'note 14, at 53-60. The purpose of the legislation was to 
compel simple but lifesaving surgery to handicapped children such as Baby Jane Doe, 
who was born with Down's syndrome, Id. at 54-55, 
57, See supra note 55. 
58, A survey conducted by the American Hospital Association's National Society for 
Patient Representatives found that the number of respondents with ethics committees 
rose from 26 percent in 1983 to 60 percent in 1986. HOSPITALS, supra note 55, at 60. 
Additionally, The California Medical Association Council has advised acute care hospi-
tals in California to establish and support an ethics committee. Cranford & Doudera, 
supra note 55, at 14. 
59. PRES. COMM'N REPORT I at 187. 
60. See Cranford & Doudera supra note 55, at 13; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT II at 
160-161; Levine, Questions and (Some Very Tentative) Answers about Hospital Ethics 
Committees, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 10 (1984). 
9
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committee members to represent the HEC.61 Fourth, the entire 
committee analyzes and reviews individual patient cases. 
HECs sometimes play an integral part in educating and ad-
vising health care practitioners on ethical issues not involving 
the patient's life or death, but nonetheless controversia1.62 HECs 
provide a forum for increased communication between the par-
ties who are making the decision and those providing medical 
care. Clarifying the facts and fostering communication may com-
prise up to 80 or 90 percent of the HEC's work.63 Many profes-
sionals consider this the paramount function.64 Even a "minor" 
decision between doctor and decisionmaker can lead to serious 
problems, if there is a failure in communication.611 
Currently, the focus of ethics committees seems to be on 
recommendations66 by the entire committee made on an individ-
ual case basis. This is the most controversial function of an 
HEC67 and is not limited to decisions to withdraw treatment for 
an incompetent adult. Other medical/legal decisions involving 
HECs include the sterilization of a mentally incompetent per-
son6S and the withholding of treatment for a terminally ill in-
fant.6s There are many reasons to involve an HEC in the deci-
sionmaking process. One purpose may be to ensure that all 
relevant medical and ethical aspects of the dilemma are dis-
closed to those who need the information.70 Another may be to 
61. This function is sometimes incorporated into the other three functions. See 
Cranford & Doudera, supra note 55, at 16; Gibson & Kushner, supra note 13, at 11. 
62. An example of such a decision was the issue of whether an incompetent should 
be sterilized faced in In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981). 
63. Murray, Where are the Ethics in Ethics Committees?, 8 HASTINGS CENTER RE-
PORT 12 (1988). 
64. "Some advocates of ethics committees as primarily consultive bodies have been 
adamant that such groups should not themselves make decisions." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N 
REPORT II at 162-63. See also Levine, supra note 60. 
65. "Without conversation, individual self-determination can become compromised 
by condemning physicians and patients to the isolation of solitary decision making, 
which can only contribute to abandoning patients prematurely to an ill-considered fate." 
J. KATZ. supra note 32, at 128. 
66. The decisions are usually not formal or final. See supra note 13. 
67. Fost & Cranford, Hospital Ethics Committees: Administrative Aspects, 253 J. 
A.MA 2687-92 (1985). 
68. In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981) .. 
69. In re P.V.W., 424 So.2d 1015 (La. 1982); In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 
716 (1984). 
70. Levine, supra note 60, at 9-10. 
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resolve disagreements among the medical staff or family mem-
. bers about the proper method of treatment for the patient. 
The specific function of the HEC often dictates its composi-
tion.71 When the committee is simply used to confirm a medical 
diagnosis72, its members would be mostly, if not entirely, medi-
cal practitioners.73 When the HEC is used to aid family mem-
bers to reach a treatment decision, the membership would prob-
ably include at least one social worker, ethicist or clergy 
member.74 Similarly, if the HEC is designed as a risk manage-
ment tool, then hospital administrators and attorneys would 
serve on the committee.711 
By definition, a true HEC is multidisciplinary78, allowing for 
differing points of view. This diversity is essential to address va-
ried aspects of the issue before it, and allows HECs to "serve as 
a link between societal values and the actual developments oc-
curring in the institutions that care for and treat the particular 
patients whose cases manifest these dilemmas."77 Diversity in 
composition also makes uniform acceptance of HEC recommen-
dations by courts difficult. 
Consultation with an HEC is typically optional, although 
some have suggested that it be mandatory for certain particu-
larly important questions.78 Few determinations of HECs are 
mandatory.79 It is more common for HECs to provide recom-
71. Comment, supra note 1, at 199. 
72. This type of committee is not a "true" hospital ethics committee, although it 
follows the Quinlan model and provides a medical second opinion. See supra note 2; see 
also notes 24-28 and accompanying text. 
73. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT II at 166. 
74.Id. 
75. Id. Minimizing legal liability is a common concern for medical practitioners and 
institutions. For additional information on the role of an HEC in legal protection, See 
Merritt, The Tort Liability of Hospital Ethics Committees, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 
(1987). See also J.W. Ross, HANDBOOK FOR HOSPITAL ETHICS COMMITTEES 93-95 (1986). 
76. The Quinlan opinion endorsed "an Ethics Committee composed of physicians, 
social workers, attorneys, and theologians." In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 49, 355 A.2d 647, 
668, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (quoting Teel, The Physician's Dilemma, supra 
note 21, at 8). See supra note 2. 
77. R. CRANFORD & A.E. DOUDERA, INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES AND HEALTH 
CARE DECISION MAKING 10 (1984). 
78. Merritt, supra note 75, at 1247-49. 
79. Id. at 1249. 
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mendations to the decisionmakers. BO 
There is basic agreement on the functions of HECs, but 
. their operational aspects differ according to the goals of the in-
stitution. Uniformity is lacking in several areas including proce-
dures for advising decisionmakers, composition of HECs, and 
record-keeping for accountability. The formation of HECs is a 
positive start toward ensuring the privacy rights of patients, and 
development of HECs continues. 
IV. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF HEC 
DETERMINATIONS 
Courts are divided on how to treat determinations made by eth-
ics committees. Bl There are few reported cases that considered 
the determination of an HEC in evaluating a treatment decision. 
The decisions that have been rendered usually arise when there 
is· a conflict between the patient's family and the attending phy-
sician or hospital. B2 Once the treatment decision reaches a court 
of law, a judge may treat the HEC determination as evidence or 
may not consider it at all when deciding the case. 
A. HEC DETERMINATION NOT RELEVANT TO COURT'S DECISION 
An opinion which gave no deference to an ethics committee 
determination was In re L.H.R .. BS The Supreme Court of Geor-
gia decided whether a terminally ill infant in a chronic vegeta-
tive state, with no hope of developing cognitive functioning, 
could be removed from a respirator.B4 An ad hoc Infant Care Re-
80. See note 13. 
81. See supra notes 83-114 and accompanying text. 
82. The concern is usually legal liability. This is understandable considering the 
case of Barber v. Superior Ct., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983), where 
the court dismissed murder charges against two doctors who had removed life-support 
systems from a vegetative patient at the request of the patient's family. One judge who 
had to make a treatment decision for an incompetent feels that "the problem really 
would not prompt the public concern that it has if it were not for the fear of civil and 
criminal liability." Byrne, Deciding for the Legally Incompetent: A View from the 
Bench, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PA-
TIENTS 25 (A. E. Doudera and J. D. Peters eds. 1982). 
83. 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984). See Wolf, Ethics Committees In The Co!-,rts, 
16 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 12-13 (1986). 
84. L.H.R. at 439. 321 S.E.2d at 717-18. 
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view Committee8G agreed with the infant's parents, physician, 
and guardian ad litem that life support systems should be re-
moved.88 The infant was removed from life support systems and 
died before the case got to the appellate court. The objective of 
the opinion was to establish guidelines for future cases.87 The 
court apparently ignored the committee's recommendation, but 
did mention that an HEC concurred in the decision.88 The opin-
ion stated that there was no need to consult an HEC in this 
case.89 
Although it considered the possibility of a distinct role of 
HECs in decisions to forego life-sustaining treatment,90 the 
court did not adopt such a role. The court simply held that "the 
decision whether to end the dying process is a personal decision 
for family members or those who bear the responsibility for the 
patient."91 The opinion acknowledged that this was a moral and 
ethical decision,92 butit declined to take the opportunity to rec-
ognize the HEC determination as helpful and admissible 
evidence. 
The court held that the family or legal guardian could de-
cide to forego treatment in similar cases, whether the patient 
was an infant or an adult, without either ethics committee con-
sultation or prior judicial approval,9s However, the court allowed 
for committee consultation if the hospital, doctor or family so 
chose.94 Thus, the proper time for consideration of an HEC de-
termination was before the treatment decision got to the court-
room. According to the Supreme Court of Georgia, once the de-
85. This is the type of committee recommended by the Baby Doe Legislation. See 
supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
86. [d. at 439, 321 S.E.2d at 718. 
87. The court stated "[t]he primary purpose for the appeal is to afford this court an 
opportunity to set forth guidelines for the future handling of this type situation." [d. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. at 446, 321 S.E.2d at 723. 
90. The court considered the opinions of several professionals regarding how these 
decisions should be made, including one in which HECs played a central role. [d. at 442-
44, 321 S.E. 2d at 720-21. 
91. [d. at 446, 321 S.E.2d at 723. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. The court deemed the decision as declining to artificially extend the dying 
process which should not be left to the state as the state has no interest in the prolonga-
tion of dying. [d. 
94. [d. 
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cision reaches the court, the HEC determination has no 
relevance. 
B. HEC . DETERMINATION USED AS EVIDENCE 
The highest courts in Minnesota96 and Massachusetts96 have 
used HEC determinations as evidence to aid in decisionmaking. 
In addition, there are unreported cases in which judges sought 
the opinion of an HEC before deciding cases involving the with-
drawal of life-sustaining medical treatment.97 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in In re Torres,98 allowed 
into evidence the reports of three area biomedical ethics com-
mittees.99 The court stated that the committee reports outlined 
the procedures used to reach a decision. loo This seemed to reas-
sure the court that doctors had reached the "right answers." 101 
In a footnote, the court remarked that hospital ethics commit-
tees are "uniquely suited to provide guidance to physicians, fam-
ilies, and guardians when ethical dilemmas arise." 102 The court 
also indicated that an HEC determination in favor of discon-
necting life-support systems in agreement with doctors and fam-
ily members would remove any necessity for a court order. l03 
The Torres court clearly gave the highest deference to an HEC 
determination, admitting it into evidence because it added cred-
ibility to the decision of the patient's conservator and family. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in the 1977 
Saikewicz case, stated that a judge may consider the findings 
and advice of an ethics committee, but is not required to do 
95. In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984). 
96. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 
N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d ll5 (Mass. 1980). 
97. Wolf, supra note 83, at 15 n. 5. 
98. 357 N.W.2d 332. In this case, the patient was a 57-year old man who was hospi-
talized after he suffered a fall in his home. Id. at 334. 
99. The court was not considering a determination by the committee in Mr. Torres's 
hospital because the hospital's position was complicated by the fact that Torres became 
comatose due to an incident at the hospital. The reports came from HECs of three other 
hospitals. Wolf, supra note 83, at 13. 
100. Torres at 335. 
101. Wolf, supra note 83, at 13. 
102. Torres at 335-36 n. 2. 
103. Id. at 341 n. 4. Three justices concurred specially in order to disagree with this 
footnote. Id. at 341. 
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SO.I04 The court recognized the difficulty in making a decision to 
forego medical treatment and welcomed the assistance of 
HECs.IOIi The same court also approved of Saikewicz in the 1980 
case of In re Spring. lOS The Spring court indicated that the con-
currence of "qualified consultants" with medical professionals 
"may be highly persuasive" in determining the proper course of 
treatment.107 The opinion implies, but does not state, that ethics 
committees are consid~red to be "consultants."lo8 
Although both Torres and Spring seem to allow ethics com-
mittees to serve as experts, they disagree on the area of exper-
tise. In Minnesota, ethics committees are given deference in 
"moral"I09 and procedural matters in resolving the issue. The 
Massachusetts court would probably use the HEC recommenda-
tion to determine whether proper medical procedure was 
utilized.llo 
C. RELUCTANCE TOWARD HEC DETERMINATIONS 
Courts are divided over the issue of allowing HEC recom-
mandations to be admitted into evidence, mainly for the lack of 
uniformity which exists.11l The diversity of membership in 
HECs and differences in the function of each ethics committee 
make it difficult for courts to support a decision made by them. 
HECs are still a fairly new concept, and hopefully time will 
bring increased procedural similarity. 
It may also be troublesome for courts to accept a decision in 
which an HEC concurred because the entire process may be con-
fidential. Courts are used to making decisions based on all avail-
able facts, but they are justifiably reluctant to give any weight to 
a group of people who are unaccountable. For these reasons, 
HECs should provide some documentation supporting the rec-
104. Saikewiczat 758, 370 N.E.2d at 434. 
105. [d. 
106. 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980) 
107. [d. at 634, 405 N.E.2d at 122. 
108. The court stated that it did not disapprove of committee review of decisions by 
members of the hospital staff, and that the "concurrence of qualified consultants may be 
highly persuasive on issues of good faith and good medical practice." [d. 
109. Torres, at 335-36 n. 2. 
110. Spring, at 634, 405 N.E.2d at 122. 
111. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text. 
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ommendation. 112 To alleviate the conflict which arises between 
accountability and the patient's confidentiality, it has been sug-
gested that HECs should make notes on the patient's medical 
file, so that the actions of an HEC would be subject to "limited 
judicial review. "118 
There is no agreement on the issues of confidentiality1l4, so 
HECs continue to operate with no legal guidance. Though some 
courts may follow the example of Torres and Saikewicz by al-
lowing HEC determinations to be considered, it would be better 
. if courts first considered the membership, procedure, and ac-
countability of the HEC in the particular case. Judges will likely 
continue their reluctance to treat all HEC recommendations as 
evidence when making the treatment decision until uniformity 
exists. 
V. THE ROLE OF HECS IN MAKING TREATMENT 
DECISIONS 
Those courts which allow an HEC determination to be used 
as evidence recognize a role for HECs in decisionmaking.' The 
question of judicial deference, however, is different than the is-
sue of the appropriate decisionmaking process because the ap-
propriate procedure determines whether the decision should be 
made by courts at all. The question then becomes: who should 
be responsible for making decisions to forego life-sustaining 
tr~atment for incompetent patients? The spectrum of answers to 
that question ranges from requiring all decisions to be made by 
a court of law to allowing the patient's family alone to decide. 
The role of ethics committees in decisionmaking is not set-
tled. In light of the varied nature of the composition and 
processes of HECs, it is understandable that their determina-
112, The court in Torres stated that the HECs involved explained their procedures 
to the court, Although the procedures were not divulged in the opinion, the documenta-
tion evidently added to the court's acceptance of the HEC determination, Torres at 335. 
113. Cranford, Hester, & Ashley, 13 LAW, MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE 54 (1985). "The 
notation in the patient's records should disclose, for example, what information was pro-
vided to the [HECl, who was involved (e.g., relatives, guardian, patient advocate), and 
what significant issues were considered." 1d. The medical records are admissible in court, 
allowing for some judicial review while retaining the confidentiality of the committee's 
deliberations or discussions. 1d. 
114. Id. at 59. 
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tions are treated with differing degrees of court involvement. 
There has been much discussion but little practice of vesting 
HECs with decisionmaking capabilities. lUI At the other extreme, 
some experts believe that HECs should not be involved in treat-
ment decisions at all.116 The recognized roles of HECs in deci-
sionmaking outside the courtroom generally fall into three 
categories. 
A. PROGNOSIS .CONFIRMATION 
In Quinlan the court allowe.d the removal of life-support 
systems without liability in favor of her guardian who sought de-
claratory relief in concurrence with the attending physicians and 
a hospital ethics committee.1l7 However, the court added "[b]y 
the above ruling we do not intend to be understood as implying 
that a proceeding for judicial declaratory relief is necessarily re-
quired for the implementation of comparable decisions in the 
field of medical practice."118 This suggests that judicial interven-
tion is not necessary when there is a concurrence among the pa-
tient's family, attending physicians, and the ethics committee. 
Because the ethics committees referred to in the Quinlan opin-
ion actually only inquired into medical issues, this view has been 
called prognosis confirmation or "medical paternalism. "119 
The prognosis confirmation function of HECs was followed 
by the Supreme Court of Washington.12o The court mandated a 
"prognosis board" made up of the attending physician and at 
least two other physicians and required a unanimous concur-
rence to make treatment decisions without court intervention. l21 
The purpose of the prognosis board was specifically limited to 
determining whether "there is no reasonable medical probability 
115. Fost & Cranford, supra note 67, at 2681-92. 
116. Siegler, Ethics Committees: Decision by Bureaucracy, 16 HASTINGS CENTER 
REPORT 22-24. 
117. 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 672. 
118. Id. 
119. Buchanan, Medical Paternalism or Legal Imperialism: Not the Only Alterna-
tives for Handling Saikewicz-type Cases, 5 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE 97 
(1979). 
120. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) overruled in part, In re 
Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984). 
121. Id. at 134-35, 660 P.2d 738 at 749. 
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that the patient will return to a sapient state."122 
Although New Jersey seemed to favor ethics committees 
only to offer medical second opinions where the decision was 
made by the court, as in Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court apparently has been willing to relinquish some of its deci-
sionmaking power and allow flexibility. In In re Jobes the court 
found that "UJudicial review is not required for the decision to 
forego the life-sustaining treatment; it may be used only in spe-
cial circumstances which may occur where there is a conflict 
among the family, the guardian, or the physician."12s In this less 
rigid interpretation, decision making by medical practitioners in 
conjunction with family members is routine; resort to judicial re-
view is made only in unusual, undefined circumstances. Under 
either the strict or flexible position, the role of HECs remains 
that of offering second opinions to the decisionmaker on issues 
. of medical diagnosis and prognosis. 
B. JUDICIALIZATION ApPROACH • 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts made its po-
sition clear in Saikewicz: 
We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the 
ultimate decision-making responsibility away 
from the duly established courts of proper juris-
diction to any committee, panel or group, ad hoc, 
or permanent. Thus, we reject the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in the Quinlan case of entrusting the 
decision whether to continue artificial life support 
to the patient's guardian, family, attending doc-
tors and hospital 'ethics committee.'lU 
Massachusetts apparently reserves for the judiciary decisions to 
forego life-sustaining treatment. In New Jersey, this method 
would only be used in exceptional circumstances. 1:'111 The 
Saikewicz decision noted that the particular case at hand did 
122. Id. at 135, 660 P.2d at 749-50. 
123. Jobes at 423, 529 A.2d at 449. 
124. Saikewicz at 758, 370 N.E.2d at 434. This appears to be the clearest statement 
in favor of judicial decisionmaking. Ct. Severns v. Wilmington Med. Ctr. Inc., 421 A.2d 
1334 (Del. 1980); Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 68 Ohio Misc. 1 (1980). 
125. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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not require an immediate treatment decision.126 Perhaps the 
case is limited to those facts. Although the harsh view of 
Saikewicz is not widely followed, many courts disapprove of 
shifting ultimate decisionmaking responsibility away from courts 
of law. l27 ' 
Judicial review of treatment decisions is expensive and 
time-consuming.128 This is especially relevant in the administra-
tion of health care, where both time and money are rapidly di-
minishing resources. The judicial process is of limited value in 
cases where the opinions were not written until long after the 
. patient had died.129 As more treatment decisions are made by 
courts, approval for treatment decisions is increasingly being 
sought. ISO One writer has suggested that this trend is difficult to 
reverse. lSI 
A judicial determination may not completely settle the di-
lemma. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated 
that even if court approval was secured, it would not preclude 
subsequent civil liability or confer immunity from prosecu-
tion. ls2 Courts may not be capable of shielding liability from 
those involved in the decision. ISS Other disadvantages are the 
possible disruption in providing medical care to the patient and 
exposure of matters which are inherently private to the public 
eye.1S4 Also, there is no evidence indicating that courts make 
better decisions. lslI 
Most courts which have addressed this issue have found 
that judicial involvement is necessary in a decision to forego 
medical treatment for a persistently vegetative patient only if 
the interested parties disagree. In refusing to follow the judicial-
126. Saikewicz at 757, 370 N.E. at 433. 
127. See, e.g., In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 639, 405 N.E. 2d 115, 122 (1980). 
128. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64 (1981). 
129. Id. 
130. Bayley, Who Should Decide?, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING 
CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 8 (A. E. Doudera and J. D. Peters eds. 1982). 
131. Id. 
132. In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 639, 405 N.E.2d 115, 122 (1980). 
133. Rothllnberg, The Empty Search for an Imprimatur, or Delphic Oracles are in 
Short Supply, 10 LAW, MEDICINE, & HEALTH CARE, 115. Mr. Rothenberg's research sug-
. gests that the judges making treatment decisions felt uncomfortable and unprepared. Id. 
134. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT II at 159. 
135. Id. at 160; Rothenberg, supra note 133, at 15-16. 
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ization view, the Supreme Court of Washington stated that 
"medical treatment of the terminally ill in Massachusetts in the 
aftermath of Saikewicz has been in a state of general 
confusion. "lS6 
On the other hand, there are advantages to judicial re-
view.1s7 Professor Charles Baron agrees with the Saikewicz court 
that "such questions ... require the process of detached but pas-
sionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which 
the judicial branch of government was created.lIlss Public scru-
tiny of the judicial process adds credibility to decisions.1s9 Also, 
because judicial decisions are based on precedent, decisionmak-
ing is "principled;1Il40 this increases consistency. The judicial 
process strives for impartialityl4l and its adversarial nature en-
sures a full and fair hearing by encouraging both sides to bring 
evidence and present arguments before a neutral judge. 142 
C. HEC ROLE TO ADVISE FAMILY 
An alternative view has been proposed which recognizes a 
role for HECs which is somewhat consistent with several 
cases.148 This view states that the decision concerning the initia-
tion and continuation of treatment made by the family of an 
incompetent, in consultation with the physician, is presumed 
correct.144 The decision must be consistent with a clear and reli-
able prior expression of the patient's preferences when he or she 
was competent,t411 if one exists. This presumption is rebuttable 
by use of conflicting evidence. Decisions should be made by a 
procedure which includes open and vigorous discussion and ac-
countability through impartial review. A true ethics committee 
136. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 126, 660 P.2d 738, 745 (1983). 
137. Baron, Medical Paternalism and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Reiman, 4 
Am. J. L. & Med. 337 (1979); President's Comm'n Report II at 160. 
138. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759, 370 
N.E.2d 417, 435; Baron, supra note 137, at 337. 
139. Baron, supra note 127, at 347. 
140. Id. at 347-48. 
141. Id. at 348. 
142. Id. at 349. 
143. See In re Torres, 357 N.W. 2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re L.R.R., 321 S.E. 2d 716, 
253 Ga. 439 (1984); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). 
144. Buchanan, supra note 119, at 97. 
145. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text. 
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(neither a medical prognosis review committee nor an adminis-
trative agency of the hospital) plays a central role in achieving 
the institutional framework that promotes an open forum for 
medical practitioners and family members. A decision will likely 
be reached without need for judicial intervention.H6 Under this 
method of decisionmaking, legal intervention can be sought 
whenever ~ny of the participants deems necessary.H7 
One expert has suggested that decisionmaking by families, 
physicians, nurses and moral advisors, consulting together, may 
be as "principled" as decisions made by a court.H8 HECs may 
even approximate the qualities of the court system. I.e Even if 
the family presumption method could not possess all of the vir-
tues of our legal system, a court decision certainly could not re-
place the ~ore intimate concerns of those who are close to and 
care for the patient. 
In states where the issue of whether the conservator of an 
incompetent person in a vegetative state with no hope of recov-
ery may decide to terminate life supports, after considering 
medical advice and the conservatee's best interest, courts have 
146. It is likely that at least two cases which were litigated would have been handled 
differently had an HEC been involved. Cranford & Doudera, The Emergence of Institu-
tional Ethics Committees, 12 LAW, MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE, 13, 15. 
147. "There are enough possibilities for error that the process should sometimes be 
reviewed judicially." President's Comm'n Report II at 160. 
148. Bayley, supra note 130, at 8. Sister Corrine Bayley, as a member of an ethics 
committee at Saint Joseph Hospital in Orange, California, assisted in drafting general 
guidelines for decisionmaking which begin as follows: 
[d. at 10. 
1) Competent adults have the right to direct the course of 
their own medical treatment. A patient and his/her family 
should have access to significant information regarding the pa-
tient's condition. 
2) Questions of when to withhold or withdraw medical 
treatment are not only medical questions; they involve per-
sonal values as well. Therefore, decisions in these matters 
should not be made by the physician alone, but should involve 
the patient and those closest to the patient. 
3) Biological life need not be preserved at all costs. There 
are times when it is more in keeping with respect for life to let 
it go than to cling to it. 
4) A decision to withhold or withdraw treatment which is 
potentially life-prolonging does not mean the staff has aban-
doned the patient, but that it is the time for an intensification 
of efforts to provide physical and emotional comfort. 
149. [d. at 9. 
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almost unanimously decided in favor of the conservator's deci-
sion to terminate treatment.1I10 This is evidence of the willing-
ness of courts to defer such a decision to a person who is closer 
to the patient. In a case which dismissed homicide charges 
against physicians who had complied with the request of a co-
matose patient's family to disconnect life support systems, the 
court stated that "the determination as to whether the burdens 
of treatment are worth enduring for any individual patient de-
pends upon the facts unique to each case," and "the patient's 
interests and desires are the key ingredients of the decision-
making process. "UIl 
Some drawbacks of this view are that the HEC may exert 
undue influence over the family members and, as a hospital 
committee, HEC members may have a conflict of interest. There 
is also a possibility of a conflict between the patient and his or 
her family,1II2 but it is more likely that the family members will 
choose according to the patient's desires. 1113 
VI. THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNIFORM ROLE IN 
DECISIONMAKING 
Although some experts believe that it is only a matter of 
time before all hospitals will have ethics committees,1114 there is 
disagreement as to whether HEC members deserve deference in 
bioethical matters.ll1l1 Almost all of those involved in the adop-
tion of ethics committees agree that the committee serves as a 
150. The courts of twelve states, including the highest courts of ten, have approved 
decisions to forego life-sustaining treatment for permanently comatose patients. Deci-
sions to the contrary have apparently been reversed by higher courts. See, e.g., In re 
Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988), Rasmussen by Mitchell v. 
Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987), John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 
So.2d 921 (Fla. 1984), In re LHR, 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E. 716 (1984), In re Gardner, 534 
A.2d 947 (Me. 1987), In re Torres, 357 N.W. 2d 332 (Minn. 1984), In re Jobes, 108 
N.J.394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987), In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419, In re Quinlan, 70 
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
151. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 492 
(1983). 
152. "The emotional, physical, or financial drain of a patient's prolonged death 
could be so devastating to relatives that the interests of the family and the patient could 
diverge." Pollock, 41 Rutgers L. REV. 505, 522 (1989). 
153. Id. 
154. Cranford & Doudera, supra note 146, at 13-14 (quoting Samuel R. Sherman, 
M.D., Chairman of the Judicial Council of the AMA). 
155. Id. 
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forum to provide and discuss information relevant to particular 
ethical dilemmas at the institution.11l8 
There is certainly a danger in allowing committee approval 
of foregoing treatment amounting to clearance and immunity for 
such decisions. It seems a better role for hospital ethics commit-
tees to serve as a consultive device to institutions, medical prac-
titioners, patients, and their families. 
The utilization. of HECs for family decisionmaking com-
bined with the possibility of judicial review is the most advanta-
geous option. Developing a uniform standard on this issue, how-
ever, would be a challenge to our system of jurisprudence. Cases 
which have decided on the issue of termination of treatment are 
not in agreement as to the basis of such a right. 1I17 Some courts 
have invited legislation to address the issue of terminating treat-
ment. lliS A legislative change may be a quicker and more appro-
priate solution.11l9 Statutes already exist which immunize certain 
hospital committees from liability.180 Some states have legal pro-
tection for Institutional Review Committees,18l but not HECs. 
Although amending current legislation to include HECs may 
seem appealing, a better approach would be to draft new legisla-
156. Kushner, Ethics Committees: How Are They Doing?, 16 HASTINGS CENTER RE-
PORT 11 (1986). 
157. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court first determined that the right to 
remove the patient's respirator was based on the right to privacy under both the New 
Jersey and federal Constitutions. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 38-40, 355 A.2d 647, 662-63, 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). The same court later predicated the right to remove 
life-sustaining treatment on the common law right of self-determination. In re Conroy, 
98 N.J. 321, 346-48, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221-23 (1985). Finally, both rationales were recog-
nized by the court in In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 347-48, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (1987). 
158. "[TJhe Legislature is better equipped than we to develop and frame a compre-
hensive plan for resolving these problems." Conroy at 388, 486 A.2d at 1244. See also In 
re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 822, 689 P. 2d 1372, 1379 (1984) .. 
159. One court has recognized that, "[nJo matter how expedited, judicial interven-
tion in this complex and sensitive area may take too long .... Too many patients have 
died before their right to reject treatment was vindicated in court." Farrell at 355, 529 
A.2d at 415. 
160. See Merritt, Tort Liability of Hospital Ethics Committees, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1239, 1249 (1987). 
161. See supra note 2. 
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tion to define, authorize, and protect the role of HECs.162 The 
only other option for full recognition of the role of HECs to as-
sist in the decisionmaking process is a comprehensive judicial 
opinion in an appropriate case. 
HECs can best be utilized by recognizing their role in advis-
ing those close to the patient and establishing a legal presump-
tion in favor of the choice of close family members. Physicians 
then must either accept the choice or challenge the decision in 
court as unreasonable. The guidance of an HEC in reaching a 
decision may allay the fears of those concerned about the influ-
ence of physicians on the family at a time of emotional turmoil. 
Open discussion may reveal the views of those who may have 
false motives for their sentiment. 
Health care institutions are the common thread in decisions 
to foreg() treatment. They are involved with the care of the pa-
tient even when courts or family members are not. It is appro-
priate for hospitals to continue caring for the patient, even when 
all hope of recovery is gone, by ensuring that the patient's right 
to self-determination is honored.16s 
. The appropriate representatives of the patient are family 
members or non-family friends who are in the best position to 
know the patient's feelings and desires, would be most affected 
by the decision, are concerned for the patient's comfort and wel-
fare, and have expressed an interest in the patient by visits or 
inquiries to the patient's physician or hospital staff.164 Under 
this standard, the term "family member" has a broad definition 
to include lovers and, if applicable, close friends. HIli 
162. Cranford, Hester, & Ashley, supra note 113, at 58. 
163. 
[Ilnstitutions need to develop policies because their decisions 
have profound effects on patient outcomes, because society 
looks to these institutions to ensure the means necessary to 
preserve both health and the value of self· determination, and 
because they are conveniently situated to provide efficient, 
confidential, and rapid supervision and review of 
decision making. 
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT II at 4. 
164. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App.3d 1006, 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 
(1983). 
165. The principle behind family decisionmaking is to allow those who have an inti· 
mate relationship with the patient to make the decision. 
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Family members are normally in the best position to make 
the most appropriate treatment decision for the truly incompe-
tent patient. Not only are family members most likely to be 
privy to any relevant statements that the patient may have 
made regarding treatment decisions, but they also have knowl-
edge of the patient's character traits. The relationship which ex-
ists between the patient and his or her family members simply 
does not exist with treati,ng physicians or judges. 
There will certainly be instances where the family's decision 
will not carry any weight. These include where the patient has 
suffered from a history of neglect or abuse by family members.l88 
Also, many patients do not have close family members or 
friends. The presumption obviously cannot be applied to those 
situations. Although many cases still must be decided by a court 
of law, a large number of these dilemmas would be solved dis-
creetly and without delay. 
In order for HECs to provide useful support in decision-
making, careful consideration must be given to their member-
ship, operations, confidentiality, and immunity. Some uniform-
ity should be atte~pted among HECs which must be true ethics 
committees and not prognosis confirmation committees. Also, 
HECs must safeguard against prejudice by committee 
members.l87 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The issue of the proper role of a hospital ethics committee 
is complex. The seemingly simplistic solution of establishing a 
presumption in favor of a decision made by the patient's family 
with the help of an HEC may not be ideal, but it is a workable 
solution to a very difficult situation. 
If the decision must be made by a court oflaw, the determi-
nations should be taken into account by the court. Where proper 
procedures are in place, the determination should be admitted 
into evidence. Even if no actual decision is made by the HEC, 
the fact that an HEC aided in discussion should add some clout 
166. Buchanan, supra note 119 at 113. 
, 167. [d. at 111. 
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to a decision made by others. Before HECs are given this defer-
ence, however, procedures must be established so that courts 
will believe that the HEC was an impartial body facilitating 
open communication. 
In many cases, the decision should not have to go to court 
at all. In those situations, the presumption of family members as 
the decisionmakers is appropriate considering the nature of the 
decision. The decision to forego life-sustaining treatment is 
neither purely legal nor purely medical, but a very difficult per-
sonal and moral decision. Even an objective guardian ad litem 
appointed to assure that the patient's best interests are being 
met often may not know as much about the patient's preferences 
as family members. 
The proper role of HECs in decisionmaking is to provide an 
open forum for discussion, especially where the presumption of a 
family decision may be applied. This solution would alleviate 
the alienation felt by family members caused by the medical pa-
ternalism approach as well as dramatically decrease the time 
that it would take for a judicial decision to be made. Although 
the presumption approach is the best of the other alternatives, 
many loopholes remain. Overall, though, it is a better method 
for reaching at least some treatment decisions without resort to 
the courts. 
In the unique case of making decisions to forego life-sus-
taining treatment, courts are not always the best decisionmaker. 
Although our court system has many positive virtues, it cannot 
replace the intimate relationship and struggle which those who 
care for the patient are confronted with in resolving these issues. 
Family members faced with the dilemma of making a treatment 
decision can benefit from the assistance of an HEC. Perhaps 
with increased uniformity and legal guidance, more people can 
utilize HECs and resolve such personal matters outside the 
courtroom. 
Carol A. Murphy* 
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